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Executive summary 
Corruption is a worldwide concern. Within Tanzania, the landmark Warioba report (URT, 
1996) confirmed the existence of extensive corruption across all sectors of the country, 
including in the public health sector where corruption has been reported at almost every 
stage of care-seeking.  
Based on an in-depth review of peer reviewed and grey literature, and complemented by 
key informant discussions with selected health-system stakeholders, this study seeks to 
deepen our understanding of informal practices amongst frontline public health providers in 
mainland Tanzania’s health sector, to explore the incentives that give rise to such practices, 
and to identify current formal and informal accountability and system-strengthening 
measures. Taken together, this evidence can be used to inform policy and practice in order 
to constrain such informal practices.  
Tanzania is a low-income country. The majority of mainland Tanzania’s estimated population 
of 56 million people live in rural areas and are dependent on underdeveloped, smallholder 
primary agricultural production. Despite strong and sustained high rates of growth – with 
gross domestic product (GDP) having remained stable at around 7% for over a decade – the 
overpowering public perception is that growth has been unequal. A large share of the 
population relies on accessing public-sector services for their health care. 
Over the last decade, Tanzania has witnessed remarkable achievements in reducing infant 
and child mortality. However, maternal mortality ratios remain unacceptably high against a 
backdrop of low facility-based deliveries. Tanzania’s public health system is stretched: 
financing is fragmented and reliant on external support, with increasing out-of-pocket 
payments; worker motivation is low coupled with severe shortages of staff, medicines and 
supplies; health facilities receive inadequate funds with limited financial autonomy (till 
recently); and local government authorities – the most important administrative and 
implementation units for public services in the decentralised health care system – are 
inadequately financed and equally challenged.   
In spite of a robust anti-corruption legal framework – including numerous laws to deal with 
ethics, integrity and anti-corruption, and measures to curb corruption, unethical behaviour 
and abuse of power – corruption has been endemic in many public health systems and 
facilities across the country. This has been observed by the Quality Improvement Framework 
in Health Care (2011-16) (URT, 2011) and the most recent draft revised National Health 
Policy (MoHCDGEC, 2017).  
Of particular concern to health-system stakeholders, including policy-makers, is the practice 
of petty corruption and health-provider absenteeism, but also low productivity among public 
health providers. The underlying reasons incentivising such informal practices are complex 
and overlapping – evidence to date underscores that they are a consequence of unmet 
expectations and needs of both providers and health users.  
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Such informal practices have come about as coping mechanisms amidst a weak and 
stretched health system that is grappling with scarcity and inadequate and inequitable 
financing of facilities and local government authorities across the country; insufficient 
support to health providers; highly challenging working environments and inadequate 
quality of services available to the public; lack of an effective social safety net within the 
context of poverty; high costs of living and inflation; and poor coordination and alignment of 
external actors and financiers to national priorities. Such adverse conditions are further 
aggravated by weak institutions and governance structures. 
Irrespective of the underlying reasons, corruption in the health sector can have severe 
negative consequences for patients, resulting in catastrophic out-of-pocket expenditures 
and further impoverishment of marginalised groups, inequality and discriminatory access to 
services and high-quality care, loss of public confidence in public health care, and inequality 
in health outcomes. These consequences not only hurt the individual, but also affect entire 
communities and the national economy, and demand that the government deliver and fulfil 
its functions and obligations in resource allocation, policies and service delivery.  
Since October 2015, Tanzania has seen an unprecedented effort by the current government 
in fighting corruption. The need to contain inefficiencies and misuse of public funds, and to 
ensure the wellbeing of every Tanzanian are at the forefront of these efforts. The 
government has adopted various interventions to strengthen overall institutional 
arrangements and specifically to improve health-system performance. Attention is focused 
on strengthening delivery of quality primary health services to optimise use of scarce 
resources, as well as to ensure equitable access to essential care. Attention is also focused 
on exploring feasible incentive schemes to motivate trained personnel to work in rural areas.  
This review explores the potential of the following five interventions that are currently being 
implemented and that seek to directly or indirectly mitigate the practice of corruption in the 
health sector: 1) performance-based financing; 2) direct health-facility financing; 3) 
improved community health funds; 4) health facility governing committees; and 5) social-
accountability initiatives.  
To conclude, corruption is a critical issue and a concern across all sectors, including health, 
but Tanzania is committed to change. Achieving universal health coverage has been a key 
priority post-independence and has been further stipulated in several policies and strategies 
in the country. Vision 2020 made the promise to achieve ‘health for all’. There is no single 
initiative that will address the constraints and challenges facing the health system in 
Tanzania, however, and that will mitigate informal practices amongst public health 
providers. The central question then becomes: what is practically feasible and will work best 
within the Tanzanian context – what mix of strategies and initiatives will result in improved 
service use and quality, health outcomes and equity to have more meaningful accountability 
for health-user rights and entitlements?  
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1. Introduction 
1.1. Background: overview of corruption 
Corruption is a worldwide concern (Ensor, 2004; Transparency International, 2006, 2015). 
And yet there is no comprehensive and universally agreed definition of it. Transparency 
International,1 a watchdog on these matters, defines corruption as the abuse of entrusted 
power for private gain. While Jain et al. (2014) describe corruption in terms of the informal 
payments or the use of influential connections to get ‘a little ahead, a little extra, a little 
quicker’ and suggest that these have become the norm.  
The practice of corruption is detrimental to economic growth. It hinders developmental 
objectives across sectors (Kaufmann, 1997; Gray and Kaufmann, 1998), increases the costs 
of doing business (Bardhan, 1997; Anderson and Tverdova, 2003; Akcay, 2006; Clausen et al., 
2011; Sullivan and Shkolnikov, 2008) and erodes legitimacy and public trust in various 
institutions (Clausen et al., 2011; Hussmann, 2011). Evidence from Afrobarometer surveys 
periodically conducted across sub-Saharan African countries to capture public attitudes on 
the prevalence of corruption suggest that corruption and mistrust in institutions feed each 
other, such that they reinforce vicious circles (Cho and Kirwin, 2007; Lavallée et al., 2008).  
With annual global spending on health care amounting to over US$7 trillion each year (Jain 
et al., 2014), the health sector is often ranked as one the most corrupt sectors in many 
countries (Lewis, 2006; Transparency International, 2006; Savedoff, 2007; Berger, 2014; 
Haroon, 2014). An estimated 10%- 25% of global spending on public procurement of health 
is lost through corruption (Jain, 2014). Health systems are particularly susceptible to 
corruption. This is in part because of the uncertainty in health care markets (not knowing 
who will fall ill, when illnesses will occur, what kinds of illnesses people get and how 
effective treatments are), but also because of information asymmetry and poor coordination 
among the many different actors that shape the health system which hinders transparency 
and accountability (Lewis, 2006, 2014; Savedoff, 2007; Hussmann, 2011).  
Addressing corrupt practices is difficult, however. What is considered an acceptable or an 
unacceptable corrupt behaviour cannot be generalised to other cultures, societies, countries 
and even across different areas within a country: it requires context-specific understanding 
(Werner, 2000; Vian, 2008). Certain forms of grand corruption may be considered criminal or 
unethical universally, but the lines between formal or informal practices are often blurred 
with respect to petty corruption – are they gifts, socially accepted favours, or bribes? It 
should also be noted that the different acts of corruption usually do not occur in isolation. 
Grand corruption at the macro level will have implications at the micro-level, and so on. A 
distinction is helpful, however, because the drivers and motivations of the actors involved 
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1.2. Corruption in Tanzania  
Concerns about corruption are widespread in Tanzania, which ranked 103 out of 180 
countries in Transparency International’s 2017 index of least corrupt countries, with a score 
of 36/100.2 The landmark Warioba report (URT, 1996),3 confirmed the existence of extensive 
corruption across all sectors of the country, ranging from ‘grand/political corruption’ (e.g. 
involving public tenders, practiced by high-level leaders and senior public servants and 
usually due to excessive greed for money and wealth)4 to ‘petty corruption’, which is 
rampant and affects ordinary people on a day-to-day basis (e.g. involving public servants  
trying to make ends meet, fuelled primarily by low salaries). According to a recent survey 
conducted by the Prevention and Combating of Corruption Bureau (PCCB) in urban Tanzania, 
the most common and recurring practices of petty corruption are bribery (40.8%) and 
favouritism (15.1%), followed by sexual corruption (7%) and takrima (5.6%) (i.e. ‘traditional 
hospitality’ which involves reciprocal gift-giving) (PCCB, 2017 quoted in Baez Camargo et al., 
2017). In the same survey, 56.5% of urban citizens reported having been asked for a bribe, 
and 36.4% admitted to having paid a bribe when accessing public services during 2016.  In 
another perception survey conducted in 2006, ordinary citizens in Tanzania were ranked as 
the number one perpetrators of corrupt behaviours, followed by local government officials, 
police and health workers (Fjeldstaad et al., 2008).  
In the public health sector, corruption has been reported at almost every stage of care-
seeking (URT, 2007a, 2011; SIKIKA, 2010; Anon, n.d.). With specific reference to public 
health services, the Warioba report (URT, 1996) singled out nurses and attendants for 
creating conditions and procedures for providing services that allowed them to solicit bribes 
from patients (SIKIKA, 2014). Indeed, around 58% of the respondents from an earlier 
Afrobarometer survey (2005)5 thought that health workers were the third most corrupt after 
the police, judges and magistrates, with 29% reported to have encountered demands for 
illegal payments at their local health facilities (REPOA, 2006a). Aiko (2015) reports that 
corruption, in its different forms, is prominent in accessing treatment from public hospitals. 
However, the most recent Afrobarometer perception survey from 2017 suggests some 
improvements to overall governance and the rule of the law: close to three quarters (72%) 
of the respondents believed the level of corruption to have decreased over the past year, 
compared to only 13% in 2014 (Olan’g and Msami, 2017). 
 
2
 Perceptions of corruption as measured by Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) score, a 
composite index which relates to perceptions of the degree of corruption as seen by business people, academics and risk 
analysts; CPI is of less relevance to the majority of the population who are not directly affected by the kind of business-
related corruption the measurement reflects. Within the CPI, ranking number 1 is deemed the least corrupt and number 
180 is the most corrupt. 
3
 In October 1995, former President Benjamin Mkapa appointed a special commission that was chaired by Judge Warioba to 
assess the state of corruption in Tanzania. 
4
 See, for example, Lindner (2014) for examples on incidences of high-profile grand corruption. Gray (2015) details the 
political economy of grand corruption in Tanzania by using four grand corruption cases that occurred over the period of 
higher economic growth from the end of the 1990s until 2014. 
5
 Based on a nationally representative random sample of 1,304 Tanzanians – 650 men and 654 women – over the age of 18. 
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1.3. Objectives 
Drawing on a political economy analysis of vulnerabilities to abuse, this background review 
seeks to deepen our understanding of informal practices amongst frontline public health 
providers in mainland Tanzania’s health sector – what motivates individual health workers to 
engage in informal practices, and what might incentivise them not to? We aim to identify 
novel approaches to addressing informal practices within health systems, with a focus on 
uncovering the informal systems and also the relationships between formal and informal 
institutions that can make the system work. More specifically, the review aims to:  
1 Identify patterns of informal practices among frontline public health providers and their 
managers and potential effects on health service users. 
2 Explore the incentives that give rise to inappropriate and ineffective care by public 
health care workers.  
3 Identify current formal and informal accountability and system-strengthening measures, 
with the potential to constrain informal practices among front line public health 
providers and their managers.  
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2. Methods 
We conducted an in-depth desk review of published peer reviewed and grey literature 
(institutional reports, working papers, evaluation studies and reports, country-specific 
commissioned reports, media coverage), including key Ministry of Health policy and strategic 
documents, as well as overall government reports and documents related to corruption in 
Tanzania with a particular focus on the health sector. The documents were accessed using 
the electronic databases of Google Scholar, Google, HINARI PubMed, through websites of 
various national and international institutions and organisations, and the media. Documents 
were also recommended by technical advisers and potential key informants.  
Literature was included if it: 1) focused on the broader health context and policy landscape; 
2) provided information on the types/forms/practices of corruption in the health sector 
(using specific key words – informal practices, informal payments, bribery, health worker 
absenteeism, under productivity); 3) reported on the causes/determinants of corruption in 
the health sector; 4) reported the consequences/effects of corruption in the health sector; 
5) identified/proposed strategies for mitigating service-provider corruption (using specific 
key words – system-strengthening measures, performance-based financing, direct facility 
financing, improved community health fund, human resource for health shortages, health 
worker motivation), including social accountability measures (using specific key words – 
community monitoring, score cards, citizen engagement, health facility governing 
committees); 6) covered Tanzania; and 7) was published in English. The documents reviewed 
dated from 1995 to 2018. Open access documents as well as subscribed content were 
included. 
We excluded all literature that did not meet the above inclusion guidelines, duplicate 
results, that was considered not relevant for the review objectives, or where the source 
could not be verified.  
The review is complemented by key informant evidence from 30 public health providers and 




 We held two group meetings with a total of 30 key informants including representatives from the research community, 
national and international organisations, and health providers and policy-makers from national (Presidents’ Office Regional 
Administration and Local Government, PORALG), regional and local government to explore detrimental and common 
informal practices that can be changed. 
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3. The national context: country 
profile and health system 
3.1. Socioeconomic and health status 
Tanzania is a low-income country with a per capita GDP of around US$879.27 (World Bank, 
2017) (see Appendix Table A1). Close to three quarters (70%) of mainland Tanzania’s  
estimated population of 56 million (2016) live in rural areas, where they are dependent on 
underdeveloped, smallholder primary agricultural production. Despite a strong and 
sustained high rate of GDP growth – which has remained stable at around 7% for over a 
decade and which is higher than the average of around 3% for sub-Saharan Africa – the 
overpowering public perception is that growth has been unequal (REPOA, 2006b). Income 
poverty is high, signalling persistent income inequality (Loewenson et al., 2018), and a large 
share of the population relies on accessing public-sector services for their health care. 
Demographic and health survey estimates from 1999 to 2015 suggests some remarkable 
achievements, with significant declines in infant and child mortality in particular (Masanja et 
al., 2008; Afnan-Holmes et al., 2015). However, Tanzania continues to face shortfalls in 
meeting key health and health service goals linked to poor outcomes in child nutrition, 
maternal health and communicable diseases, and is seeing rapidly rising levels of non-
communicable diseases (Todd et al., 2017). The reported maternal mortality ratio remains 
unacceptably high at 556 deaths per 100,000 live births against a backdrop of low facility 
deliveries. Weaknesses in the health system have had a direct impact on the delivery of 
maternal and newborn services.  
Though the ‘right to health’ has still not yet been enshrined in Tanzania’s new constitution, 
the government recognises that all citizens have the right to a healthy and safe environment 
(SIKIKA, 2014). When analysing data on access to health services, however, Mtei and 
Makawia’s (2014) findings suggest that health is not universal; access to health care is not 
equal and service quality varies, which leads to inequitable life outcomes across 
socioeconomic groups.  
3.2. National development and health policy context 
Health and wellbeing are addressed as priorities in various global commitments such as the 
Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) (UN, 2015), as well as in national commitments like 
Tanzania’s 2025 Development Vision (URT, 1995), which was adopted in 1999 and sets the 
country’s long-term development agenda. The Vision identifies five key priorities for 
Tanzania’s growth: 1) high-quality livelihoods; 2) peace, security and unity; 3) good 
governance; 4) education; and 5) a competitive economy, with wellbeing and universal 
 
7
 All figures in United States dollars in this report reflect current/nominal US dollar unless otherwise indicated. 
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access to good quality health care an underlying theme. It emphasises a government system 
that is transparent, responsive and accountable, and that is free from corruption of every 
kind (ibid.).  
Achieving universal health coverage has been a key priority since post-independence and is 
further reiterated in the national health policy and Health Sector Strategic Plans (HSSP). 
Overtime, national strategies have been set to achieve such goals – from the National 
Strategy for Growth and Poverty Reduction (2005-2010 and 2010-2015) (URT, 2005, 2010) to 
the Primary Health Services Development Plan (URT, 2007b) and the 2007 revised National 
Health Policy (URT, 2007a).  
3.3. Health-sector context 
Health care services in the public sector are provided through Tanzania’s decentralised 
health system, across an extensive and interacting network of services at community, 
primary, secondary, tertiary and quaternary care level (see Figure 1). The public sector is the 
largest sector within Tanzania’s health system, complemented by private not-for-profit 
(faith-based and non-governmental organszation (NGO)) services and private for-profit 
services8 (see Appendix Table A2). 
Figure 1: Tanzania’s decentralised health system  
 
Source: URT (2015). 
 
8
 There are about 7,400 health facilities, of which 75% are owned by the public sector (2018). Almost 85% of the population 
receive health services from primary health care facilities. The dispensary is the most peripheral level of service delivery, 
catering for between 6,000 and 10,000 people. Health centres are expected to serve about 50,000 people, which is 
equivalent to approximately the population of one administrative division, and provides in-patient services for patients 
referred from lower levels. Higher up the service pyramid, each district is supposed to have a district hospital. Where there 
is no government hospital, an available faith-based or NGO hospital is often designated as the district hospital. The regional 
hospital offers services similar to those at district level but has specialists in various fields and offers additional services not 
available at district hospitals. The national referral hospital is the highest level of in-patient services. 
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A World Bank (2015) report points to a range of serious health-system challenges that 
contribute to poor health outcomes, and identifies three critical supply-side challenges that 
still stand, namely: shortfalls in health funding, shortage and inequitable distribution of key 
human resources of health cadres, and constrained local government authorities (LGAs) and 
facilities. We consider each of these in turn in the remainder of this section. 
3.3.1. Shortfalls in health funding 
Tanzania faces shortfalls in health funding, and is making slow progress towards meeting the 
Abuja commitment9 of 15% of government financing or 5% of GDP funding for health care. 
For the 2017/18 financial year, the Government of Tanzania allocated 7% of the national 
budget (inclusive of Consolidated Fund Services (CFS)) or 10% (exclusive of CFS) to the health 
sector; this estimate includes all on-budget funding from development partners (see 
Appendix Figure A1; Lee and Tarimo, 2018). However, the health system is stretched with 
health financing pools segmented across programmes and providers and it being reliant on 
external support (which accounted for about 41% of total health expenditure on health in 
2015), and with a significant share being off-budget.10   
The community has become an important health care financer. Out-of-pocket payments 
increased from 18% of total health expenditure in 2008 to 22% in 2015, and the government 
set a target of enrolling 45% of the population in prepayment schemes by 2015 in an effort 
towards raising additional revenue for the health sector and providing flexible funding to 
health facilities (MoHSW, 2013). To date, formal and informal health insurance mechanisms 
have had limited success, however, covering only a minority of the population:11 by March 




 In April 2001, heads of state of African Union countries met and pledged to set a target of allocating at least 15% of their 
annual budget to improve the health sector. At the same time, they urged the donor countries to “fulfill the yet to be met 
target of 0.7% of their GNP as official Development Assistance to developing countries, drawing attention to the shortage of 
resources necessary to improve health in low income countries (WHO 2011) 
10
 Health Basket Funds (HBF), the preferred mode of financing by many development partners (of which there were seven 
HBF partners in FY2016/17), is intended to supplement the low level of domestic financing for the health sector in order to 
expand access to high-quality primary health care. HBF accounted for 10% of total on-budget sector spending in FY2015/16 
and 6% of the budget in FY2016/17 (DANIDA, 2018). At the level of LGAs, 75% of non-salary recurrent funding (excluding 
cost-sharing) was recorded as HBF in FY2015/16, and 22% of total funding. In 2016/17, a highly complex system of 
performance element was introduced, with a proportion of funds allocated based on the previous year’s progress with an 
indicator set. Late disbursement by some HBF partners continues to be an issue. The combination of weak coordination 
from the development partner side and capacity gaps within the government have reduced the efficiency of HBF 
governance mechanisms. 
11
 A key part of the HSSP III for financing the health sector was to increase complementary funding, consisting of 
Community Health Fund (CHF) membership fees, user fees, and insurance reimbursements including a National Health 
Insurance Fund (NHIF) and Social Health Insurance Benefit (SHIB) (MoHSW, 2013). The NHIF was introduced in 1999 to 
cover public servants (later coverage was extended to employees from the formal sector); followed by establishment of 
CHF, a voluntary community insurance scheme for the informal sector in 2001. The CHF faces structural problems with 
respect to design, enrolment, servicing and sustainability, and has had limited success, covering only a fraction of the 
population, as noted earlier. By 2014 CHF enrolment was 6.7%, far below the national target of 30%. 
12
 Health Financing TWG 3 meeting, 19/10/2018 (NHIF 7% and CHF 25%). 
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The Ministry of Health has a draft health financing strategy (HFS) (2016-2025) in place, that 
awaits Cabinet approval.. It highlights the guiding principles of equity, solidarity, 
transparency, sustainability and efficiency. The Strategy aims at improving health insurance 
coverage (see section 6.1), especially in the informal sector to find a better way of protecting 
the poor against catastrophic health care payments and of promoting universal access 
according to a nationally defined minimum benefit package (Mtei et al., 2012).  
3.3.2. The shortage and inequitable distribution of skilled health workers  
The health sector is challenged with both a shortage of and an imbalance in certain cadres, 
as well as inequitable distribution of its key health workers (Manzi et al., 2012; MoHSW, 
2013; Sue et al., 2016; Buguzi, 2017; Sirili, 2018; Sirili et al., 2018).13  
Available data suggests a low density of key health workers: the national average ratio of 
doctors, nurses and midwives per 10,000 population is 7.74, which is well below the ratio 
recommended by the World Health Organization (WHO) of a minimum of 23 doctors, nurses 
and midwives per 10,000 population density needed to deliver essential maternal and child 
health services (Loewenson et al., 2018). The Council Community Health Plans (CCHP) 
2017/18 data reports an overall shortage of 55% in staff across all main cadres, especially 
clinicians, nurses, pharmaceutical technicians, laboratory technicians, radiographers, 
therapists, health officers and health administration (with shortages of 57% for skilled 
workers and 51% for unskilled workers)  (see Appendix Table A2). 
The introduction of the decentralised health-sector administration system following the 
1990s health-sector reforms (which gave LGAs/districts the mandates for hiring and firing of 
health providers within the districts) failed to address the geographic imbalance of health 
providers – for doctors in particular and to ensure their retention at district level (Sue et al., 
2016; Sirili et al., 2018).14 Rural staffing challenges included lack of attractive retention 
schemes, poor remuneration, and insufficient equipment and medicines to do the work. 
Doctors preferred practising in urban settings where they could ‘moonlight’, or work at 
multiple hospitals and clinics, to supplement low salaries. A partially centralised system of 
management of human resources for health (HRH) was introduced in 2006: the central 
government’s role was to fill the vacancies identified by the local government (Sirili et al., 
2018). Also, an increase in salaries for doctors and other public health workers in 2006 
attracted many private-sector health workers back to the public sector, resulting in HRH 
shortages and potentially the provision of substandard care in the private sector as a 
 
13
 The workforce shortage reached emergency levels in 2005, with only 16% (3,836/23,474) health care professionals who 
had been trained over the previous decade hired to work for the government (Sue et al., 2016). 
14
 Tanzania had a decentralised system of monitoring health care workers and limited information on where trainees 
actually went. Many new doctors simply did not show up: for example, according to a 2014 MoH report, only 63% of 
doctors reported to their assigned station, and of those who went to their post, 13% left within one year due to quality of 
life, delays clearing hardship claims, moving costs, bad roads, and lack of social services (quoted in Sue et al., 2016).  
Between 2005 and 2008, the President’s Office of Public Service Management approved over 12,000 new health positions 
to try to recruit these workers back into Tanzania’s public sector. Many positions remained unfilled. Filling vacant health 
care posts involves bureaucratic processes across several ministries, with complex and unwieldy coordination between local 
and central government bodies that prolonged the process. 
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consequence (Sue et al., 2016). The second five-year HRH strategic plan was adopted in 2008 
and recognised mid-level cadres, such as Assistant Medical Officers (AMOs), as critical for 
‘task-shifting’ duties from doctors or taking on some of their work. In 2010, the government 
passed the Public-Private-Partnership (PPP) Act to encourage more public-private 
collaborations.15.The Ministry of Health also established recommendations for staffing 
levels16 in the different types of health facility (Manzi et al., 2012). 
District hospitals, as well as other lower-level health facilities, continue to suffer an acute 
shortage of medical doctors. Retention of health providers – and particularly doctors – at 
district level remains a big challenge, with only 31% of the country’s doctors serving the rural 
population in 2012, which accounted for over 75% of the total population. Estimates from a 
2013 qualitative study carried out in three districts of Tanzania suggest that this ratio 
subsequently decreased to 26% (Buguzi, 2017). The same study described the unfavourable 
working conditions that doctors face, and the council managers who are also financially 
constrained who endeavour to retain doctors using different strategies, including career 
development plans, minimum financial incentive packages and avenues for doctors to 
practise privately within their hospitals (ibid.). 
3.3.3. Constrained LGAs and facilities 
Within the framework of ongoing reforms,17 the current 167 LGAs are the most important 
administrative and implementation units for public services (see Figure 2). They are 
responsible for preparing annual health-sector plans to implement health programmes in 




 The second five-year HRH strategic plan involved renewed efforts in planning, policy development, education, training, 
workforce management and utilisation, partnership creation, research and development, and promotion of adequate 
financing and leadership. 
16
 Two clinicians and two nurses for each dispensary and four clinicians and nine nurses for each rural health centre. Health 
workers delivering the majority of care in rural primary health facilities (dispensaries and health centres) are generally 
‘clinical staff’  (AMOs or Clinical Officers or Assistant Clinical Officers) or nurses; there are no medical doctors. However, 
because of health-worker shortages, it is not uncommon to find auxiliary nursing staff with only basic primary education of 
seven years and only a one-year introduction to nursing course performing the tasks of a trained nurse [Manzi et al., 2012]. 
17
 The current 25 regional and 167 local government authorities (LGAs, or councils) are responsible for delivering health 
services, and report administratively to the President’s Office – Regional Administration and Local Government (PO-RALG); 
the Ministry of Health, Community Development, Gender and Children (MOHCDGC) is responsible for policy formulation, 
supervision and regulation for all health services throughout the country, as well as playing a direct role in the management 
of tertiary health services. 
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Figure 2: Decentralised health systems structure 
 
Source: Adapted from HSSP III (2010-2015) (MoHSW, 2013). 
The aim of decentralisation was to foster economic growth in order to improve efficiency, 
equity and resource mobilisation, through leadership, accountability and partnership at all 
levels (Maluka et al., 2011). However, the process of decentralisation by devolution has not 
been fully realised, hindering the operation of health facilities. Most LGAs face inadequate 
and unreliable financing for public service provision (Frumence et al., 2013), which impacts 
negatively on their managerial duties, including providing timely supportive supervision to 
the facilities under their jurisdiction. LGAs remain dependent on central government grants, 
and face delays in the disbursement of these funds from the central government (ibid.; 
Nyamhanga et al., 2013). To deal with these delays, district councils complement funds from 
their own budgets (e.g. from cost-sharing) and with ‘loans’ from other ongoing council 
projects (Frumence et al., 2014). Also, until very recently, most public-sector primary health 
care (PHC) facilities had limited financial autonomy to utilise their own funds; many did not 
even have bank accounts. Funding for PHC was thus channeled through LGAs that could limit 
resources reaching lower levels (MoHSW, n.d.). To overcome some of these shortcomings, 
the government introduced performance-based financing of facilities in some districts (see 
section 6.1) and direct health facility financing (see section 6.2). 
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4. Corruption: the policy context 
Tanzania’s political, legal and economic measures in response to the economic crisis of the 
early 1970s resulted in severe budget constraints. It also created several loopholes and a 
fertile ground for corruption in many sectors, including health (URT, 1996). Deliberate 
efforts to address corruption have been part of the political agenda in all regimes since 
independence,18 as evidenced by the passing of a Prevention of Corruption Act No. 16 in 
1971; and forming the Anti-corruption Squad in 1975.19  
Following the release of the Warioba report in 1996, Tanzania adopted a policy of zero 
tolerance to corruption, and in 2001 enacted the Finance Act and the Public Procurement 
Act which focused on mitigating corruption risks in management of public finance and 
procurement.20 Around the same time, the government embarked on a focused institutional 
strengthening initiative to increase public service efficiency and to address corruption as a 
national agenda, involving both government and non-government actors.  
To govern actions of civil servants, the Public Service Act No. 8 of 2002 gives mandates to 
the Public Service Management to oversee public service ethics in government ministries, 
independent departments and executive agencies by coordinating and monitoring ethical 
conduct at workplaces. Under the Public Service reforms (PSR), which were guided by a 
comprehensive PSR programme (1999-2004),21 a rational pay reform policy was adopted in 
the 1990s to raise the minimum wage and other compensation benefits. The PSR reforms 
intended to reduce the scope of government operations to affordable levels; rationalise the 
machinery of government to improve efficiency and effectiveness; develop an open, 
objective and competitive pay structure; and decentralise executive responsibilities to local 
government, executive agencies, NGOs and the private sector. Other key 
strategies/systems/Acts adopted or passed in an attempt to curb corruption include: 
 the National Anti-Corruption Strategy and Action Plan (NACSAP) in 1999 and a Good 
Governance Coordination Unit (GGCU) in the President’s Office to oversee all activities 
aimed at combating corruption.  
 the Human Resources Management and Employment Policy in 1999 and the passing of 
the Public Service Act of 2002 and its subsidiary regulations in an effort to reinstate 
meritocracy in the management of human resources in public service. 
 
18
 The ruling party’s manifesto indicated the need for deliberate efforts to address corruption 
(http://ccmchama.blogspot.com/2016/02/ilani-ya-uchaguzi-ya-ccm-2015-2020.html) 
19
 www.acaauthorities.org  
20
 Other laws to deal with ethics, integrity and anti-corruption measures included: 
The Permanent Commission of Enquiry Act (1966) (to check on abuse of power by government officials and its agencies), 
The Economic Sabotage Act (1983), The Economic and Organized Crimes Control Act of 1984 (incorporated offences under 
the Prevention of Corruption Act as economic offences), The Economic and Organized Crimes Control Act (Amendment) 
1998, The Public Leadership Code of Ethics (Amendment) Act 2001, the Human Rights and Good Governance Commission 
Act 2001 (Nkinga, 2003). 
21
 http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/CAFRAD/UNPAN010583.pdf 
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 the Open Performance Review and Appraisal System (OPRAS)22 in July 2004, through 
Circular No.2 of 2004, to facilitate the identification of training needs of civil servants.  
In addition, several structures were established towards strengthening national 
accountability systems (Mutahaba, 2005; URT, 2005; REPOA, 2006a). For example:  
 Establishment of the Permanent Commission of Enquiry in 1966 to check the abuse of 
powers by government officials and agencies. 
 Establishment of the Prevention and Combating of Corruption Bureau (PCCB) under the 
prevention and combating of corruption Act No.11 of 2007, with the aim of investigating 
corruption complaints from various sources, and to educate and motivate citizens to 
participate in the fight against corruption.  
 Transforming the Permanent Commission of Enquiry into Commission for Human Rights 
and Good Governance in 2001. 
In spite of the existence of a robust legal anti-corruption framework – including numerous 
laws to deal with ethics, integrity and anti-corruption measures to curb corruption, unethical 
behaviour and abuse of power – corruption has been endemic, with the public health sector 
noted to be among one of the most corrupt sectors. The Quality Improvement Framework in 
Health care (2011-2016) notes that corruption is likely to be one of the major barriers in 
providing quality health services in the public sector (URT, 2011). The National Health Policy 
(MoHCDGEC 2017) reiterates that corruption persists in many public health systems and 
facilities all over the country, despite implementation of various national anti-corruption 
strategies and measures for preventing corruption in the health sector in the last ten years 
(efforts have included capacity-building training on good governance and anti-corruption 
programmes, dealing with complaints and handling mechanisms and training on ethics and 
integrity committees).  
Since October 2015, Tanzania has seen an unprecedented effort by the current government 
towards fighting corruption (Baez Camargo et al., 2017). Amongst key health-sector leaders 
within Tanzania, there is growing recognition of the adverse effects and the urgent need to 
address the practice of corruption that not only threatens equity but also health outcomes. 
And this is not withstanding the need for effective and efficient use of scarce resources in 




 OPRAS replaced the Confidential Performance Appraisal System. 
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5. Rule-breaking and rule-bending: 
the types, determinants and effects of 
informal practices among frontline 
public health providers  
This review has identified three common acts of informal practices amongst frontline public 
health providers, namely: petty corruption, absenteeism and under-productivity, with the 
former two being more prolific and of increasing concern to policy-makers. Also of concern 
are practices linked to budget leakages at various levels of the health system (for example 
fraudulent claims, payroll irregularities and mismanagement), which have the potential to 
directly or indirectly influence provider and service-user behaviour at primary care level. The 
following sections detail some of these practices. 
5.1. Types of informal practices 
5.1.1. Petty corruption 
Petty corruption in this instance refers to everyday abuse of entrusted power by public 
health providers at primary care level in their interactions with citizens trying to access basic 
health services (Lewis, 2006; Transparency International, 2006; Seppänen and Virtanen, 
2008; Hussmann, 2011; Peiffer and Rose, 2014). While there is no universal definition, it 
includes unofficial in-kind or cash payments from health service users to providers in 
exchange for a certain favour, with attitudes and perceptions towards informal payments 
very much shaped by different cultural and social norms.  
At a broad level, between 10% and 45% of total out-of-pocket payments in low-income 
countries are reported to be informal transactions (Aryankhesal, 2017). Using 
Afrobarometer survey data (rounds three, five and six),23 Figure 3 presents the level and 
evolution of informal payments in public hospitals and health centres in Africa in 2005-2006, 
2011-2013 and 2014-2016, and suggests that informal payments are almost non-existent in 
some countries, while they are a real problem in others. With the exception of a few 
countries, the author notes a general downward trend between round five (2011-2013) and 




 Since 1999, Afrobarometer surveys have been conducted every two to four years (depending on the country), with 
samples ranging from 1,200 to 2,400 respondents and primarily aimed at producing data on national public attitudes on 
democracy and governance in Africa in order to measure the social, political and economic atmosphere in those countries. 
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Figure 3: Percentage of individuals who had to pay a bribe at least once in their local public 
hospital/clinic during the last 12 months 
 
Source: Kankeu (2013). 
In Tanzania, petty corruption is documented to be one of the most commonly encountered 
informal practices in both urban and rural areas (URT, 1996; Kamuzora, 2005; Mamdani and 
Bangser, 2005; Manzi et al., 2005; Lewis, 2006; Transparency International, 2006, 2015; 
REPOA, 2006a; Kruk et al., 2008; Seppänen and Virtanen, 2008; Stringhini et al., 2009; 
SIKIKA, 2010, 2014; Mæstad and Mwisongo, 2011; Lindkvist, 2013; Peiffer and Rose, 2014; 
Binyaruka et al., 2015; Kankeu and Ventelou, 2016; Baez Camargo et al., 2017; Kassa and 
Baez Camargo 2017;  Anders and Makene, 2018). Acts of petty corruption include, but are 
not restricted to, fees for basic health services or supplies (including drugs) meant to be 
provided free of charge; to obtain specific favours such as expedited or extra services 
(favouritism); as insurance for receiving better future care from the health provider(s); and 
unsolicited gift-giving and unofficial payments as a means to establish a personal 
relationship with the provider, or as an expression of gratitude or sign of appreciation.  
Transparency International’s data from 2015 suggests high bribery rates in public hospitals in 
Tanzania (20%) and Uganda (25%), compared to Burundi (2%) and Rwanda (11%). According 
to the 2005 Afrobarometer survey, about 29% of respondents reported that demands were 
made of them to engage in illegal payments at their health facilities, with 15% making such 
payments (REPOA, 2006a). A 2013 phone survey carried out by TWAWEZA,24 revealed that 
patients are more likely to pay bribes in government health facilities, where staff shortages 
and long waiting times put pressure on staff and patients alike (TWAWEZA, 2013a), while a 
more recent study from 2016 suggests that more than 30% of respondents had experienced 
at least one health worker demanding an informal payment of them (Kankeu and Ventelou, 
2016). Stringhini et al. (2009) note that informal payments are frequently initiated by the 
patient, however, because of the risk for health workers to directly ask for them.  
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The findings detailed below from a survey conducted by Maestaad and Mwisongo (2011) are 
quite illustrative of the practice of informal payments in mainland Tanzania. The authors 
found that health workers at all levels received informal payments/bribes in a number of 
different contexts, including:  
 when patients want to reduce waiting times and bypass a queue – often the lower 
cadres seek bribes and help patients bypass the queue by presenting the patient to the 
doctor as a relative; 
 when patients are in need of drugs and other medical supplies that they are supposed to 
get for free – health workers reportedly pretend that there are shortages of drugs and 
supplies, and ask patients to ‘buy’ the missing supplies from the private market, or from 
clinicians who are running private pharmacies within consultation rooms, despite their 
being pharmacies at the health facility; 
 for small services that are meant to be free, as well as in the case of major surgeries;  
 as gifts of appreciation, but which may involve expectations of better treatment in the 
future.  
The same study reports that the amounts paid as bribes or informal payments varied 
substantially from place to place, depending on the type of service provided. The payments 
ranged from 500 up to a few thousand Tanzanian shillings (Tshs) for typical nurse-related 
work; and up to Tshs 50,000 in relation to surgery and other time-intensive work carried out 
by doctors.25 Though doctors may typically be involved in the largest transactions, the lower 
cadres are likely to encounter patients more frequently and therefore have the potential to 
extract a larger number of smaller bribes. It was reported that health workers sometimes 
share the payments received, but only partially, and more rarely within than across cadres. 
Finally, the main reasons given for health workers taking bribes were reported to be: low 
salaries and inadequate incentives (mentioned by 81% of respondents), greed (34%), 
patients enticing staff to accept bribes (24%), and a perception by health workers that 
corruption is the norm (18%) (ibid.).  
Pregnant women, children below the age of five years and adults aged 60 years or over are 
eligible for free outpatient services in government health facilities, but rarely receive free 
treatment (Mamdani and Bangser, 2005; Manzi et al., 2005; Kruk et al., 2008; Twaweza, 
2013b; Binyaruka et al., 2015). There is evidence that health providers often take advantage 
of the shortages of drugs, supplies and health workers, and of patients’ ignorance regarding 
cost-sharing measures and service-delivery procedures (SIKIKA, 2010). Accessibility to health 
care is usually not straightforward either, with the ease of receiving medical care sometimes 
being associated with whether the patient knows the health provider in charge (relatives are 
considered first), or whether the service seeker can afford a bribe (which tends to increase, 
 
25
 Since 1999, Afrobarometer surveys have been conducted every two to four years (depending on the country), with 
samples ranging from 1,200 to 2,400 respondents and primarily aimed at producing data on national public attitudes on 
democracy and governance in Africa in order to measure the social, political and economic atmosphere in those countries. 
25
 1,000 Tsh = 0.8 US$. 
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the more distant the relationship with the health provider and the more urgent the 
situation) (Kassa and Baez Camargo, 2017).  
5.1.2. Health-provider absenteeism 
Health-provider absenteeism is reported to be a chronic – although often undocumented 
and unmeasured – problem in developing countries (Lewis, 2006; Seppänen and Virtanen, 
2008; Diestel et al., 2014), including in Tanzania (URT, 1996; Transparency International, 
2006; Manzi et al., 2012; TWAWEZA, 2013b; SIKIKA, 2014). Health providers do not report to 
work for various reasons, some of which are legitimate (such as to attend seminars and 
trainings or to collect their salaries, vaccines or other supplies from the district capitals), and 
others not so (i.e. unauthorised absences by health workers during all or part of their paid 
working hours).  
Findings from a survey of 133 health facilities carried out in five districts in southern 
Tanzania revealed that almost half of clinical staff (40/82) and nurses (45/81) surveyed, were 
absent from their place of work on the day of the survey. Almost all were reported to be 
‘officially’ out: attending seminars (38%), on long trainings (8%), on an official trip (25%), or 
on leave (20%) (Manzi et al., 2012). The same survey reports that only 14% (122/854) of the 
recommended number of nurses and 20% (90/441) of the clinical staff had been employed 
at the facilities, less than the national average of 35%. In addition, although reproductive 
and child health clinic nurses were present for seven hours a day, they only worked 
productively for a little over half (57%) of the time they were present at the facility – so-
called ‘silent’ absenteeism. This was possibly a result of infrequent and unsupportive 
supervision and oversight, as almost two-thirds of the facilities had received fewer than 
three supervisory visits from their managers (council health management teams) during the 
six months preceding the survey. It should be noted that these managers in turn face 
genuine challenges themselves, often times being financially constrained and having 
competing priorities at the district level.26  
‘Moonlighting’ amongst doctors – whereby clinicians work in private practices when they are 
supposed to be attending clinics at public facilities – is also a common and accepted practice 
in Tanzania, particularly in urban areas (Theisen, 2006). This is an unorthodox form of 
corruption, however, as it is not usually identified with theft or the use of public office or 
resources for private gain. 
Overall, in a context of a shortage of health providers, the absence of a significant number of 
health workers from their place of work (be it official or unofficial) can result in overburdened 
and unmotivated health workers, as well as providing fertile grounds for informal practices. 
The absence of adequate and timely supervision further aggravates the situation. 
 
26
 In the decentralised Tanzanian health system, the district Council Health Management Team (CHMT) is responsible for 
the health services provided in its district. The persons in-charge of primary facilities are responsible for overseeing the day-
to-day activities of their facilities and communicating with CHMTs on various requirements related to drugs, supplies and 
equipment. CHMT members are supposed to visit each facility on a monthly basis to supply commodities, review Health 
Management Information System (HMIS) data and support frontline staff. 
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5.1.3. Underproductivity: the ‘know-do gap in providers' performance  
Poor productivity of health workers is noted to be another common phenomenon in 
Tanzania (Leonard and Masatu, 2010; Lindkvist, 2013; Mæstad, 2006; Manzi et al., 2012), as 
well as in other developing countries (Lewis, 2006).  
Health providers perform below their capacity/knowledge for various reasons, including: 1) 
the absence of an enabling and supportive environment (such as lack of essential supplies, 
drugs, equipment or referral services) which deters health workers from performing to their 
professional satisfaction; 2) where facilities are inadequately staffed, overworked health 
workers are simply not able to deliver to par – Manzi et al. (2012) note that severe shortages 
in frontline health workers results in the available health staff being overburdened as they 
end up working extra hours to attend to many patients on a daily basis;  and 3) when it is 
intentionally practiced, a ‘go slow’ approach is used as a means of eliciting informal 
payments from patients for better services. Only the latter is an act of corruption, as well as 
a sign of unprofessionalism.  
Several papers report on the practice of health providers intentionally lowering their efforts 
as a means of extracting informal payments from patients (Kamuzora, 2005; SIKIKA, 2010; 
Mæstad and Mwisongo, 2011; Lindkvist, 2013). Findings from SIKIKA’s (2010) survey suggest 
that health workers found loopholes and devised creative tactics to extract bribes from 
patients including by imposing unnecessary delays in service delivery (reported by 34% of 
respondents). In another instance, based on findings from focus groups with 58 health 
workers representing different cadres and levels of care in one rural and one urban district 
in Tanzania, Maestaad and Mwisongo (2011) note that ‘health workers are involved in “rent-
seeking” activities, such as creating artificial shortages and deliberately lowering the quality 
of service, in order to extract extra payments from patients or to bargain for a higher share 
of the payments received by their colleagues’.  
A report from the Ministry of Health and Social Welfare (MoHSW, 2013) notes that poor 
human resource management and weak enforcement of policies and regulations have 
fueled the shortage of health service providers and have led to low productivity. 
5.1.4. Budget leakages in the health system 
Underfunding of the health sector is further aggravated by system bottlenecks, which result 
in leakages of public funds that are intended for facilities. 
Resources allocated to the health sector flow through various layers of national and local 
government institutions on their way to health facilities. Budget leakages due to fraud, abuse 
and corrupt practices may occur at multiple points in the health system, at national, regional 
and district levels. They also occur for various reasons, including inadequate monitoring, 
oversight and controls; poorly managed expenditure systems; lack of effective auditing and 
supervision; and organisational deficiencies over the flow of public funds. Such practices can 
directly or indirectly influence provider and consumer behaviour at primary care level, 
including their delivery of, and access to, quality health care. To quote a few examples –  
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 Weak institutions have posed serious challenges in the procurement and distribution of 
essential drugs. The drug supply chain is extremely complex, with several parties 
involved before the product reaches end users. Subsequently it is susceptible to 
mismanagement and corruption at every and any stage of the regulatory process. For 
example, in January 2016, the Medical Stores Department (MSD) director reported a 
TShs 500 billion drug shortage for FY2015/16 (Buguzi, 2016a), which limited the agency's 
capacity to meet the increasing demand for medicines in the country. An MSD audit of 
Global Fund grants in mainland Tanzania found the governance, oversight and 
management of grant implementation arrangements to be ineffective. Shortly after, the 
Health Minister suspended four MSD directors for alleged misuse of TShs 1.5 billion 
(Kayera, 2016).27 
 Parallel off-budget financing: a considerable share of donor funds to the health sector 
continues to be channelled off-budget through international and NGOs. This means the 
funds remain outside the review of regular budget allocation, discipline and oversight 
processes, with an inherent risk of corruption, especially if they need to be spent quickly.  
 Payroll irregularities, in particular the existence of ghost workers, constitutes a serious 
problem, with the health and education sector topping the list of institutions harbouring 
the most ghost workers (Buguzi, 2016b).28 Until recently, appropriate management, 
accountability and personnel information systems on even simple things such as 
attendance were often lacking. A recent national verification exercise noted that the 
number of public ghost workers had reached 19,708 by 31 January 2017, enabling the 
government to save close to US$10 million of taxpayers' money that would have been 
spent on their salaries every month (Standard Digital, 2017). It is noteworthy that 
Tanzania's public-sector wage bill has escalated sharply over the past few years, 
accounting for more than half of government revenues, partly because of the numbers 
of people registering fake names to collect extra wages (Buguzi, 2016b). It is equally 
important to note that despite the shortage of health workers in public health facilities, a 
majority of medical graduates trained locally and abroad were not recruited (Buguzi 
2017; Sirili et al., 2018).29 As noted by the Minister of Health,  ‘the Wage Bill is the 
determining factor’0 (Buguzi 2016b). Payroll clean-up and management of the public 
workforce is a key priority. Since 2012, the government has started using the Human 
Capital Management Information System (HCMIS) that enables officers to eliminate 
workers who do not qualify to remain on the payroll (Buguzi, 2016b).  
 
27 The Global Fund audit found stock-outs of varying magnitudes and differences between stock dispatched by the Global 
Fund’s Pooled Procurement Mechanism and received at the central medical store valued at US$1.55 million. The Office of 
the Inspector General also identified a lack of proper records at regional/district medical offices that distribute 50% of all 
health commodities. There were also unexplained differences ranging between 40% and 50% for the quantity of malaria 
and HIV test kits and anti-malaria medicines reported as delivered by the Medical Stores Department and accounted for by 
the district medical offices/facilities.  
28
 The public-sector health workforce represents the largest single group of civil servants in Tanzania. On average, the 
government spends about TSh5.5 trillion annually on salaries, equivalent to 51% of the country’s revenues. In 2015/16, the 
government was spending an estimated US$260 million per month to pay salaries of its more than 550,000 civil servants – 
equivalent to more than half of government revenues taken in over the same period [US$1 = 2,182.0000 Tsh]. 
29
 The government may have lost billions on training doctors it is not able to absorb; the cost of training one doctor is 
estimated at US$25,000 (TSh 55 million) (Buguzi, 2016b). 
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 Fraudulent payment claims by NHIF-accredited health facilities that provide low-cost 
health services to clients can result in losses in billions of shillings, and hamper the 
NHIF’s efforts to achieve a higher health insurance coverage (Oforo, 2017).30 As of 2018, 
the NHIF introduced advanced electronic cards for its members in an effort to seal 
loopholes of corruption and mismanagement and to curb the misuse of funds. 
The literature from Tanzania also reports on unnecessary referrals (SIKIKA, 2014) and on 
grand corruption that includes public scandals or cases (Gray, 2015; Mpambije, 2017).  
5.2. Determinants of informal practices  
Evidence to date suggests that, on the whole, informal practices amongst public health 
providers are a consequence of the unmet expectations and needs of health providers and 
service users. As such, many behaviours are coping mechanisms, amidst a weak and 
stretched health system that is grappling with inadequate and inequitable financing of 
facilities and local government authorities across the country, insufficient support to health 
providers, and poor coordination and alignment of external actors and financiers to national 
priorities.   
The 1996 Warioba report (URT, 1996) noted that the increasing practice of corruption was a 
result of inadequate public understanding of the cost-sharing policy that was instituted to 
overcome the burden of providing free public health services. This policy and the under-
funding of health services resulted in patients bribing health providers to qualify for services; 
a shortage of medicine and equipment with better-off patients more likely to access limited 
stocks as they could afford to pay bribes; the establishment of private facilities by heath 
service providers or individuals taking up secondary jobs in private hospitals  to augment 
their poor salaries; poor leadership and supervision by managerial staff; and weak ethics 
governing the medical and nursing professions overall (SIKIKA, 2014).  
This subsection summarises some of the key reported causes or underlying determinants of 
the most common informal practices among Tanzania’s public health providers at primary 
care level. 
5.2.1. Health worker (dis)incentives 
Health-worker motivation is low due to severe shortages of staff, medicines and supplies, 
while health facilities receive inadequate funds and have limited financial autonomy 
(Mæstad, 2006; Leonard and Masatu, 2010; Manzi et al., 2012; Olaffsdottir et al., 2014; 
SIKIKA, 2014; Buguzi, 2017; Todd et al., 2017). The immense health needs in Tanzania dwarf 




 Figures from 2017 suggest that only 28% of Tanzanians are enrolled in health insurance schemes, and the NHIF is 
struggling to ensure that at least 50% of all Tanzanians are on medical cover by 2020 (Oforo, 2017). 
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Even basic infrastructure is often lacking, meaning that health workers can perform only 
limited tasks. They are challenged by unfavourable working conditions (i.e. inadequate 
supplies/drugs, an inability to attend to patients in critical conditions, lack of reliable means 
to transport patients to higher facilities for referral health care); poor prospects for career 
progression; inadequate salaries and delays in payment of financial allowances with no 
standardised financial incentive system across districts; and an unsupportive broader 
environment characterized by difficulties in securing houses for rent and lack of alternative 
opportunities to earn extra income. Such conditions incentivise health providers to seek 
informal payments or bribes (Makeula, 2000; Kamuzora, 2005; Stringhini et al., 2009; 
Songora Makene and Mpango, 2017) or to ‘moonlight’ (running an ‘unofficial’ private 
facility/clinic besides their official job in the public sector).  
The culture of per diems and allowances often linked to externally funded seminars, 
trainings and capacity-building workshops has also been used in many countries as a coping 
strategy to compensate for low public-sector wages. Such practices have proved to be 
extremely costly for developing-country governments, including in Tanzania, where the 
amount allocated for allowances for FY2009/2010 represented 59% of the total wage bill31, 
for example (Policy Forum, 2009). The Policy Forum (2009) notes that when allowances are 
‘only loosely related to actual cost incurred and when they are high relative to basic salaries, 
they become an incentive instead of a reimbursement’, and they are ‘likely to induce and 
reward behaviour that is counterproductive to the provision of quality services by public 
servants’ (p1/2). Such uncoordinated practices that bypass national planning mechanisms 
can at times pull many workers from their place of work and have negative consequences 
for service delivery: they can ‘pay 3 days wages for one day’s attendance. It pays people not 
to do their work’ (Policy Forum, 2009, p10). 
Despite the widespread corruption and poor quality of services delivered, Anders and 
Makene (2018), Lindkvist (2013) and Strong (2017) show that health professionals in 
Tanzania work very hard, however, and use a range of  ‘practical norms’ to get their job 
done and provide essential public services to the poorer sections of the population. 
Furthermore, they often go beyond the call of duty to assist patients by using personal funds 
and working overtime or double duty. Indeed, a follow-up phone survey by TWAWEZA32 in 
August 2016 was very positive, citing improvements in certain headline indicators such as 
the presence of health workers and their manners and attention to detail (although 
complaints about poor facilities, lack of equipment and shortages of medicine remained 
significant). Problems arise, therefore, due to the informality and clandestine nature of 




 Pensionable and non-pensionable basic salaries plus pensions 
32 data were collected from 1,836 respondents from the second Sauti za Wananchi panel, conducted between 2 and 17 
May 2016. 
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5.2.2. Drugs stock-outs 
Reliable information and analysis on stock-outs of essential drugs remains relatively scarce, 
however a study covering 923 public health facilities (hospitals, health centres and 
dispensaries) conducted by the Ifakara Health Institute in 2012 found high levels of stock-
outs, with an average of only 37% of public facilities being in stock for any given drug from a 
set of 14 essential tracer medicines. The study found considerable variation between 
districts and across medicine types, with somewhat better levels of availability in private 
facilities and urban areas (IHI and MoHSW, 2013). The 2012 Afrobarometer survey noted 
that 88% of Tanzanians reported experiencing shortages of medicines and other medical 
supplies at a public health facility in the preceding year (REPOA, 2012).  
5.2.3. Institutional and legislative constraints 
Institutional constraints – including lack of or limited supervision, weak enforcement of 
accountability, lack of transparency and limited capacity for investigating corruption – also 
contribute to petty corruption in public health services (SIKIKA, 2014). A survey of 
community members found a statistically significant association between institutional 
factors that were tested (i.e. lack of limited supervision and accountability) and the 
likelihood that a patient or carer had paid a bribe to a health worker (p<0.001) (Kassa and 
Baez-Camargo, 2017). 
According to SIKIKA’s (2011) facility-based research of 390 health service users across six 
districts, existing complaint mechanisms are not effective either, mainly due to absence of 
confidentiality (with complaint boxes in open visible areas); illiteracy, as the majority of 
service users do not know how to read and write; and complaints rarely being addressed. 
These findings are further reiterated in interviews with community members that reveal the 
limited effectiveness of Health Facility Governing Committees (HFGCs)33 (SIKIKA, 2014). In-
depth interviews with HFGC members themselves indicated that a majority (62%) admitted 
that they did not follow up patients’ complaints about corruption, partly due to the 
unwillingness of facility management to cooperate. Generally, rural community members 
are concerned about the negative consequences of denouncing corrupt perpetrators, and 
are therefore unwilling to do so (Kassa and Baez Camargo, 2017). 
Overall, Tanzania’s legal and regulatory frameworks have not been strong enough to fight 
corruption either (URT, 1996; Ngware, 2005; SIKIKA, 2014). Some of the identified 
weaknesses include: 
 Inadequate administrative and public control mechanisms, with systems lacking in 
transparency and political or public oversight. 
 
33
 Tanzania has a policy commitment to involve communities in prioritising and planning local health services through 
HFGCs that were introduced in 1999, albeit without being uniformly implemented. HFGCs were introduced alongside the 
CHF, and as part of the government’s efforts to implement a bottom-up planning approach in the development and 
implementation of Council Community Health Plans (CCHPs) (IHI, 2011).  
Strengthening accountability for better health outcomes through understanding health-system bottlenecks:  
insights from Tanzania 
29 
 Lack of clear standards of performance for providers, coupled with weak organisational 
and poor management structures. 
 Lack of effective auditing and supervision. 
 Limited enforcement of rules/no sanctions, where abuse prevails and good performance 
goes unnoticed. 
 Lack of accountability systems and political or public oversight (resulting in provider 
absenteeism, moonlighting, informal payments, poor quality of care, irregularities in 
purchasing practices, etc.). 
 Lack of citizen involvement and oversight, weak public participation in decision-making, 
and patients being unsure of their rights.   
5.2.4. Summary 
Kankeu (2018) explores the coexistence of informal payments in public health facilities of 
several African countries with other failures in health care provision (see Figure 3, Kankeu 
2013). 
Figure 4 below presents data from round five (2011-2013) of the Afrobarometer survey 
(Kankeu, 2018), where people were interviewed about other problems they have faced in 
public health facilities besides informal payments. Commonly reported problems include 
absenteeism of doctors, stock-outs of medicines and other medical supplies, long waiting 
times in public health facilities, lack of attention or respect from health staff, and dirty 
hospitals and health centres. 
Reporting on an earlier individual-level analysis, Kankeu (2018) notes that people who report 
having faced these dysfunctions were also more likely to report having had to pay bribes. 
Similar patterns emerge when the data is aggregated at the national level. Though not 
causal, according to Kankeu the analysis suggests that countries with high proportions of 
individuals reporting having paid bribes in public hospitals and health centres are also those 
where high proportions report:  a) having faced doctors’ absenteeism (r = 0.62, p-value = 
0.0001); b) having faced stock outs of drugs and other medical supplies (r = 0.56, p-value = 
0.0006); c) having experienced long waiting times (r = 0.30, p-value = 0.0825); d) having 
faced lack of attention/respect from medical staff (r = 0.58, p-value = 0.0003); e) having 
faced insalubrity in these health facilities (r = 0.61, p-value = 0.0001). The author concludes 
that, ‘actual or fictitious shortages of human and material resources [in the face of patient 
needs] create incentives for patients to pay more for the services they are seeking, including 
paying informally’. 
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Figure 4: Percentage of individuals who have faced some problems in their local public 
hospital/clinic during the last 12 months (2011–2013) 
 
Source: Kankeu (2018). 
Research findings underscore that practices of petty corruption are fundamentally 
motivated by adverse conditions involving scarcity, inadequate quality of services available 
to the public and the lack of an effective social safety net. This is corroborated by the 2017 
PCCB survey (quoted in Kassa and Baez Camargo, 2017), where most respondents named 
poverty, high costs of living, inflation and inefficient bureaucracy/public service delivery as 
key drivers of corruption. 
In sum, the underlying reasons incentivising the many forms of corruption are complex and 
overlapping. Existing governance structures in Tanzania are not strong enough to fight all 
forms of corruption. Some performance problems, including absenteeism, stem from weak 
governance systems that fail to reward good performance and to discipline workers who are 
under-performing or are absent. Poor remuneration and inadequate or unattractive working 
conditions are also potential determinants of corruption, along with social pressures from 
family or peers to engage in corrupt behaviour in order to progress professionally or to 
support ones family. The mistrust of public institutions is a further determinant (Cho and 
Kirwin, 2007).  
5.3. The effects of informal practices 
Informal practices undermine the quality of health care delivered, which has a central role in 
shaping health outcomes. Several studies report on the disproportionate negative effects of 
petty corruption on the most vulnerable groups – the disabled, pregnant women and the 
elderly, as well as the poor, uneducated and the marginalised –who are unable to seek 
timely and appropriate care (Tibandebage and Mackintosh, 2002; Mamdani and Bangser, 
2004; Manzi et al., 2005; Ngware, 2005; Cho and Kirwin, 2007; Kruk et al., 2008; Lavallée et 
al., 2008; Mboera et al., 2009; SIKIKA, 2010, 2014; Mæstad and Mwisongo, 2011; Peiffer and 
Rose, 2014; Binyaruka et al., 2015; Kankeu and Ventelou, 2016; Ngata, 2016; Baez Carrago et 
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al., 2017; Kabote, 2017). Indeed, the poor and the most vulnerable need more health care, 
but often get less (Smithson, 2006).  
Through rent-seeking behaviour, health providers are focused more on maximising income 
from bribes, giving less attention to their performance, and consequently are less sensitive 
to patients’ medical conditions and needs (Lindkvist, 2013). For providers with dual public 
and private practices, patients are often encouraged to seek care from their private facilities, 
possibly incurring higher fees (SIKIKA, 2014). When the poor have money, they often seek 
care from mission hospitals due to perceived staff commitment and readily available 
medicines, equipment and other medical supplies (Mamdani and Bangser, 2004; Leonard et 
al., 2002). In general, the availability and (official or unofficial) cost of medicine, distances to 
health facilities and provider–user relationships influence care-seeking behaviour and 
utilization of health services. 
It is also important to note that the very practice of being unethical and soliciting informal 
payments can lead to poor self-esteem amongst health providers and can impact negatively 
on the quality of their work: aside from the fear of being found out and reported, Stringhini 
et al. (2009) report on the increasing vulnerability of health providers who engage in 
informal practices. 
Petty corruption leads to wastage of patients’ resources (both time and money), which 
impoverishes them further and deepens their vulnerability (Mamdani and Bangser, 2004: 
Transparency International, 2006; SIKIKA, 2010; ). One study notes that about 41% of 
Tanzanian households reported having cut down other spending and 37% borrowed 
money/sold household assets to finance health care (Kruk et al., 2008).  
Aside from undermining service provision, health provider absenteeism and poor 
productivity also results in wastage of resources, and possibly closure of public health 
facilities (Manzi et al., 2012). Further, grand corruption that involves misuse of public funds 
has implications for efficient use of available resources and for the implementation of 
effective policies, strategies and programmes to ensure the wellbeing of all Tanzanians 
(Mpambije, 2017).  
Thus, irrespective of the underlying reasons, corruption in the health sector can have severe 
negative consequences for patients, resulting in catastrophic out-of-pocket expenditures, 
inequality in access to services and high-quality care, loss of confidence in public health care, 
and inequality in health outcomes. These consequences not only hurt individuals, but also 
affect entire communities and the national economy. Further, corruption poses an obstacle 
for the government to deliver or fulfil its functions and obligations in terms of resource 
allocation, policies and service delivery. 
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6. Potential initiatives to mitigate 
informal practices among frontline 
public health providers 
The Government of Tanzania has adapted various interventions to strengthen overall 
institutional arrangements and to specifically improve health-system performance. This 
includes addressing inefficiencies, containing misuse of public funds, reducing recurrent 
expenditure and reorienting public expenditure towards development spending, and 
intensifying efforts to mobilise domestic revenue. Attention is focused on strengthening 
delivery of quality primary health services to optimise the use of scarce resources, as well as 
to ensure equitable access to essential care, in line with the HSSP IV on social accountability, 
improved governance and strengthened systems (MoHSW, 2015b).  
This section summarises the following five interventions that are currently being 
implemented, and that have the potential to directly/indirectly mitigate against corruption 
in the health sector: 1) performance-based financing; 2) direct health-facility financing; 3) 
improved community health fund; 4)  Health Facility Governing Committees; and 5) social 
accountability initiatives. 
6.1. Performance-based financing 
To address longstanding system constraints towards better health outcomes, the 
Government of Tanzania introduced a Pay for Performance (P4P) pilot in Pwani region in 
2011. This pilot was designed to motivate health workers towards providing better quality 
reproductive and child health (RCH) care: health providers and their managers were 
financially rewarded for attaining pre-defined performance targets on coverage and quality 
of RCH health services (Borghi et al., 2013; Binyaruka et al., 2015). Analysis of pilot data 
collected over an 18-month period suggests the strong enforcement of a fee-exemption 
policy for pregnant women and children under five years using maternal and child health 
(MCH) services in the P4P intervention districts, with the chances of paying informal 
payments for MCH services reduced over time (ibid.). In an effort to increase service 
utilisation for rewards through P4P, providers are more likely to reduce/remove user 
charges in order to attract more clients.  
Additional financial resources at the facility level for ‘performing’ facilities helped address 
some of the supply-side barriers (e.g. infrastructure, drugs and supplies) in the short run, with 
the potential for improved service quality also (Olaffsdottir et al., 2014; Binyaruka and Borghi, 
2017). Overall, though the pilot findings were mixed and inconclusive, they do suggest that in 
the short-run P4P can incentivise health providers to be more responsive to service users (for 
example, by changing their manner, ‘being kinder’ or by extending opening hours; Binyaruka 
et al., 2015), as well as strengthening both external and internal accountability, and enhancing 
transparency and responsiveness to service users (Mayumana et al., 2017). This is 
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notwithstanding any concerns for potential displacement of non-incentivised services and the 
consequences for team work in larger facilities (Mamdani et al., 2012). Analysis of data from 
another Tanzanian study also suggests that by using performance incentives, health providers 
are incentivised to exert more effort and to perform to their maximum capacity/knowledge 
(i.e. the ‘know-do gap’ is reduced and productivity improves) (Mæstad, 2006; Leonard and 
Masatu, 2010; Gertler and Vermeersch, 2013). 
The Pwani P4P pilot has since been redesigned and transformed into a results-based 
financing (RBF) initiative (MoHSW, 2015b, 2015c), which aims to enhance provider 
accountability for results and encompasses broader health-system strengthening measures. 
RBF incentivises multiple levels of the health system for both quality and quantity of PHC 
services at dispensaries, health centres and district hospitals (ibid.). The scheme has been 
rolled-out to the seven regions, those with poorer health outcomes and higher poverty 
levels. A midterm review of the programme shows consistent increases in quality scores 
across nearly all indicators (World Bank, 2018). A useful exercise will be of use to see if the 
P4P pilot findings can be further validated by the ongoing evaluation of the national RBF 
intervention;34 i.e. to ascertain the potential of RBF to strengthen accountability and 
eventually reduce the incidence of petty corruption, staff absenteeism and poor productivity 
among front-line providers, as well as on fostering system-wide reforms. PBF interventions 
in sub-Saharan Africa have been largely externally financed; sustaining motivation as well as 
the overall intervention is a core concern (Paul et al., 2018.  
6.2. Expanding the scope of fiscal decentralisation in the 
health sector: direct health facility financing  
Since the inception of health-sector reforms in Tanzania in 1999, health planning and its 
implementation was decentralised to CHMTs that were responsible for managing local 
authority funds disbursed from the central government. However, available evidence 
indicates that this decentralisation arrangement did not improve health-services delivery at 
council level as expected. Health facilities were often cash-strapped due to inadequate and 
late receipt of funds from the council, which ultimately hampered effective and efficient 
service delivery (see section 3.3.3). In 2016/17, Tanzania revised this health-sector 
decentralisation arrangement by extending fiscal decentralisation to health-facility level: 
direct health facility financing (DHFF) was adapted to facilitate quick disbursement of funds35 
to all public health facilities across mainland Tanzania (URT, 2017).  
DHFF signals a shift towards performance-based, output-based payments. The aim is to 
improve service delivery through increased flexibility and autonomy, to build local 
ownership and accountability, to ensure efficiency and effectiveness of basket funding and 
to improve public financial management (ibid.). All facilities now operate a single DHFF bank 
 
34
 Conducted by IHI in collaboration with London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine and the Chr. Michelsen Institute. 
35
 Health Basket Funds are transferred directly to more than 5,000 service-provider accounts according to a transparent 
formula. HBF disbursements are performance-based, monitoring 19 performance indicators including child survival rates, 
out-of-pocket expenditures, and incidence levels for diseases such as HIV, tuberculosis, and malaria. 
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account and by February 2018 two rounds of payments had been directly disbursed into all 
facility bank accounts by the Treasury.36 Previous facility-based multiple accounts have been 
closed and cost-sharing revenue has been consolidated at the regional level. The financial 
management arrangements under DHFF are set in such a way that all health facilities have to 
use electronic accounting systems for reporting expenditure. A recent update on the status 
of DHFF implementation shows poor reporting of financial resources by health facilities, 
however, which is largely attributed to poor coverage of facility supervision by district 
council managers. For the DHFF initiative to work in a complex and resource constrained 
sector, it will require good planning and coordination amongst the many actors that finance, 
manage and therefore influence the sector systems. 
6.3. Formalising payment: an improved community health 
fund 
The strategy of strengthening existing pre-payment schemes (such as the community health 
fund (CHF)) and enforcement of an exemption and waiver policy (using vouchers) has long 
been suggested as one way of limiting rent-seeking behaviour among health providers in 
Tanzania ( Manzi et al., 2005; Kankeu and Ventelou, 2016), as well as in other settings 
(Balabanova and McKee, 2002).  
The government is in the process of finalising its comprehensive health financing strategy 
(HFS) as a means to end fragmentation of health insurance coverage, to increase resources 
for health, to provide a minimum benefits package for all, and to increase the efficiency of 
health spending. The ultimate goal of the health insurance reform agenda is the 
establishment of a single national health insurer (SNHI). The proposed SNHI legislation is 
expected to be considered by the National Assembly in November 2018. If the bill is passed, 
implementation is not expected to begin until 2019 or 2020. In the interim, the plan is to 
have two concurrent schemes: the NHIF for the formal sector37 and the improved CHF (the 
iCHF) intended to cover the informal sector and rural households. Scaling-up the iCHF, under 
the NHIF’s oversight, is considered an essential step in promoting access to health care while 
national health insurance reforms continue to be deliberated (MoHCDGEC, 2018). A portion 
of iCHF enrolment for the poor38 is expected to be subsidised by the Government of 
Tanzania (Lee et al., 2018).   
According to Lee et al. (2018), two issues warrant attention as the iCHF scales up. The first is 
the challenge of keeping administrative and operational costs reasonable below 11% of 
 
36
 Dr Anna Nswilla. Assist Director HS, PORALG. ‘Updates in implementation status of DHFF’. Presented at Basket Funders 
Committee (BFC) meeting, 9 February 2018.  
37
 The NHIF is expected to cover the formal sector; funds will continue to be pooled nationally. A proposed legislative 
amendment would make enrolment automatic and mandatory for all formal-sector workers (the formal public sector 
comprising civil servants, other government workers, and their dependents; and the formal private sector). 
38
 Those living on an income that is below the national poverty line, equivalent to about US$1 per capita per day using 2005 
purchasing power parity estimates (World Bank, 2015). A household budget survey estimated that 28% of Tanzania’s total 
population will be eligible for the subsidy (MoHCDGEC, 2018). 
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contribution income for the iCHF to be sustainable. For this, the iCHF will need to achieve 
economies of scale: enrolment must remain at 70% in order to ensure an adequate pool of 
resources to pay for services (MoHCDGEC, 2018). The second issue is whether iCHF 
capitation payments will be sufficient to finance facilities to provide necessary services. Lee 
et al. (2018) also point to the potential of the ongoing RBF and DHFF to improve quality of 
service delivery at public facilities, which should then help to improve the quality and 
availability of services at iCHF-financed facilities – a factor that is critical to encourage 
beneficiaries to re-enroll.  
Lessons can be learnt from two existing initiatives to help turn the CHF into a viable and 
sustainable micro-insurance scheme, namely: a public-private iCHF scheme that has been 
implemented in the Northern zone since November 2014 with support from PharmAccess 
and the Dutch government39 (Ngowi, 2016, Lambrecht, 2017); and the CHF‐Iliyoboreshwa 
scheme that has been implemented in Dodoma region since 2012 with support from the 
Swiss government (Stoermer et al., 2013; Kalolo et al., 2018). 
Faced with a large informal economy and a small tax-base, the Government of Tanzania has 
been searching for alternative mechanisms to redesign their health-financing system, like 
the use of a public-private partnership. The iCHF, a voluntary, district-owned health 
insurance scheme, was launched in November 2014 in Northern Tanzania with the aim to 
increase access to quality health care for people in the informal sector, mostly rural and low-
income groups. The iCHF is built on a strong partnership between the  NHIF (which 
administers the scheme at regional level),40 the district councils (local government), public 
and private health care facilities and PharmAccess.41 Under the iCHF, people can enroll at 
public and private facilities that are being supported to offer better quality services through 
training, equipment provision and the upgrading of infrastructure. Enrolment is reportedly 
high and far above original projections, which is partly attributed to access to care at private 
providers. The endorsement by local districts, regional authorities and the national 
government (including NHIF), has reportedly been instrumental.42 However, a descriptive 
cross-sectional survey conducted in the Kilimanjaro region notes that while the iCHF 
programme is making a modest contribution to universal health coverage when considering 
equity and financial protection, it is falling behind on quality (Lambrecht, 2017).  
 
39 https://www.pharmaccess.org/update/ichf-health-insurance-program-now-covers-over-100000-people-in-tanzania/ 
40 NHIF pays health care facilities directly into their bank accounts for each household enrolled in the iCHF, adding an 
incentive for facilities to improve their quality and attract more registrants. The iCHF offers a more extensive benefits 
package, covering primary care and referral for inpatient care for up to five days of admission; the co-premium is Tsh 
30,000 (less than US$14) per household per year, and the Government of Tanzania matches this amount in order to cover 
costs and ensure sustainability of the scheme. The premium is thus 100% locally funded. 
41
 PharmAccess designed the iCHF package and with the support of the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, provides actuarial 
expertise, technical assistance and funding for support on marketing, administration and quality improvement using 
the SafeCare standards. 
42
 With financial support from PharmAccess, the NHIF set up a website – www. chfiliyoboreshwa.co.tz – that provides 
information regarding the iCHF and will also enable clients to pay for their relatives and friends online from anywhere in the 
country (Ngowi, 2016). 
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The redesigned CHF‐Iliyoboreshwa has been implemented in the seven district and 
municipal councils of Dodoma Region since 2012 and is fully integrated in the structures of 
LGAs. It is part of the Health Promotion and System Strengthening Project that has been 
funded by the Swiss government since 2011. After one year of operation, the CHF-
Iliyoboreshwa reportedly covered 20% of the population, which is well above the national 
average of 7.9% of the previous CHF system (Stoermer et al., 2013) (see Appendix Table A3 
for details of the differences between the standard and the redesigned CHF‐Iliyoboreshwa). 
6.4. Strengthening Health Facility Government Committees 
Introduced in 1999, Health Facility Government Committees (HFGCs) were designed to 
operate in all public primary health facilities as a mechanism to improve accountability 
between health care providers and communities. In theory, their role is extensive: to 
receive, discuss and approve facility annual plans and budgets; to ensure the availability of 
drugs and equipment in the facility; to identify and solicit financial resources for running the 
facility; to report health-provider employment and training needs to the district council; to 
be available at the facility and liaise with facility management teams and other actors to 
ensure the delivery of quality health services; to assist facility management teams in 
planning and managing community-based health initiatives within its catchment area in the 
context of the Ward Development Committee (WDC); and to support the WDC in sensitising 
the community to join the CHF.43 The HFGC is supposed to be politically independent, 
however members of the village government have been found to represent 21% of 
committee membership (IHI, 2011).  
Evidence to date suggests that despite their achievements and potential for strengthening 
accountability, HFGC members might not be capable of fulfilling all their responsibilities 
(SIKIKA, 2014). According to studies undertaken in several District Councils, various factors 
hinder the effective participation of HFGCs in the development of CCHPs (for Manyoni 
district see Kilewo and Frumence, 2015; for Musoma district see Vedastus, 2016; for Ulanga 
district see IHI, 2011), including: inadequate knowledge and weak management capacity, 
especially amongst those members with only primary education; weak communication and 
information-sharing strategies between the Council and HFGC members; limited community 
awareness of the roles and responsibilities of the HFGCs; and inadequate financial resources 
for implementing their activities. As noted earlier, HFGC members do not have the mandate 
and the capacity to take corrective measures against corruption (SIKIKA, 2014). In addition, 
communities do not believe that HFGCs can represent their concerns at facility level: ‘trust’ 
remains an issue (IHI, 2011; Vedastus, 2016). HFGC meetings that are held at facility level are 
usually controlled by the facility representative, which has the potential to limit 
representation of community issues (IHI, 2011). Further, only the village government has the 




 The HFGCs typically consist of five elected community members and three appointed members, with representation from 
the WDC, the village government committee and the health facility.(IHI 2011) 
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In short, HFGCs have the potential to serve as bridges between health facilities and their 
communities, but improvements need to be made in terms of resourcing, capacity and  
autonomy to participate in planning and managing CCHPs in general and health-facility plans 
in particular. They also need to have the means and mandate to hold corrupt health workers 
to account. Equally, communities need to be sensitised on the roles and responsibilities of 
HFGC members and steps need to be taken towards building trust between HFGCs and the 
communities they serve. Encouragingly, steps are already being taken to strengthen HFGCs, 
and for greater involvement of community leaders through HFGCs.  
6.5. Social accountability initiatives 
Much of the current focus on accountability has been with regards to top-down, mostly 
administrative accountability, where CHMTs report progress on a quarterly basis to higher 
authorities regarding the use of funds to implement health plans at council level (i.e. 
performance-based basket funds, DHFF and PBF, all of which are focused on Reproductive, 
Maternal, Neonatal, Child and Adolescent Health (RMNCAH)-related indicators, or factors 
affecting RMNCAH service delivery.  The current HSSP IV aims to broaden the scope of 
accountability by prioritising engagement between health providers and the communities they 
serve. Increasingly, attention is being paid to social accountability mechanisms, including the 
use of community score cards and social accountability mapping (MoHSW, 2015a).  
6.5.1. Community score cards (CSC) 
To promote greater community participation and strengthen two-way accountability 
between health facilities and communities, lessons can be learned from a number of NGOs 
that have been working closely with their communities in developing and implementing 
Community score card (CSC) initiatives.44  
CARE Tanzania’s CSC programme has reportedly contributed to strengthening service 
provision and community–provider relations (Wales and Wile, 2015). The initiative has 
facilitated improvements in mobilising and focusing resources on key health-systems 
priorities; in identifying corrupt providers and, over time, reducing unethical practices; in 
improving provider behaviour; and in improving respect and collaboration between health 
professionals, communities and district administrators. Save the Children’s CSC initiative that 
was implemented in a remote area in the country’s southeast region suggests that citizens 
were empowered to understand that they have the right to health and entitlements in 
regard to maternal, newborn and child health. Anecdotal evidence from the Chukua Hatua 
programme by Oxfam (UK) and its implementing partners suggests some successes in 
creating active citizenship; that is, citizens who know their rights and responsibilities, and 
are able and willing to demand them (Green, 2015). 
 
44
 CSCs can be defined as a participatory tool that (i) is conducted at micro/local level and uses the community as the unit of 
analysis; (ii) generates information through focus group interactions and enables maximum participation of the local 
community; (iii) provides immediate feedback to service providers and emphasises immediate response and joint decision-
making; and (iv) allows for mutual dialogue between users and providers, and can be followed by joint monitoring (CARE 
Malawi, 2013). 
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6.5.2. Social accountability mapping 
SIKIKA adopted the social accountability mapping (SAM) tool45 and approach to reinforce 
accountability in health resources management and to provide space/opportunities for 
citizens to participate in public resource management. For 2016-2020, SIKIKA’s focus is on 
strengthening local government systems and working around systemic issues/constraints 
(such as availability of health commodities, human resources for health, health governance, 
finance systems and structures, health infrastructures, and amenities) that affect health 
service delivery. Sikika’s SAM approach at both central and local levels has reportedly 
contributed to the reinforcement of accountability, promoted governance and enhanced 
better public resource management and delivery of quality health services (SIKIA, 2016). 
Noted achievements include: citizen awareness of their rights and responsibilities; improved 
functionality of HFGCs in 28 facilities in Simanjiro in 2014; aiding facilities’ access to and use 
of their community health fund contributions by activating their dormant bank (Singida rural 
district); supporting the capacity of councillors to monitor and interpret council plans and 
budgets at LGA level and taking measures towards council staff engaging in unethical 
actions; and increasing collaboration between councillors and LGAs, including increasing 
transparency and accountability amongst councillors. SAM is a resource-intensive approach, 
and ongoing challenges include the need for timely access to information, coping with 
occasional resistance from LGAs, and the commitment of SAM members.  
Citizen involvement is noted to be central to addressing inappropriate practices and 
ensuring services meet their needs. A combination of strategies to promote increased 
interactions between citizens, providers and their managers need to be employed to address 
informal payments, with attention given to ensuring equitable access to quality care by the 
poor. Strategies include:  
 increasing providers’ awareness of forms, consequences and dangers of corrupt 
practices through poster displays and provider meetings (e.g. health providers to wear 
name tags for easy identification and reporting) (Kamuzora, 2005)  
 training public officials on the ethics of good governance and explicitly establishing and 
enforcing ethical standards of conduct among providers and their supervisors (ibid.; 
SIKIKA, 2014)  
 rewarding good performance and honest behaviour, and enforcing law and punishment 
to health providers involved in corrupt practices (Kamuzora, 2005; REPOA 2006a; 
Fjeldstad et al., 2008; Gaitonde et al., 2016)  
 frequent supportive supervision of health providers by their managers to help address 
the problems of absenteeism and low productivity  amongst health workers (Kamuzora, 
2005; Manzi et al., 2012; Olaffsdottir et al, 2014).  
 simple and effective channels (such as complaint boxes, raising community awareness, 
hotlines, etc.) with appropriate legal support to enable citizens to raise concerns without 
fear of retaliation (Kamuzora, 2005; Olan’g and Msami, 2017).   
 
45
 SAM is a tool and approach for monitoring public services at both central and local government levels, through 
assessment of plans and resource allocations, expenditure management, performance management, and public integrity 
and oversight functions (Mkani, 2016).  
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7. Discussion 
Tanzania is committed to combat corruption. Tanzania’s Vision 2020 made the promise to 
achieve ‘health for all’, which has been a key priority since post-independence and is further 
reiterated in the national health policy. Indeed, increasing domestic resource mobilisation 
through the establishment of sustainable financing mechanisms for health is an important 
component of the universal health coverage agenda.  
Yet corruption has become part and parcel of daily life in Tanzania, as in many developing 
countries. Despite institutional and legal transformation to fight corruption, the 
phenomenon continues to challenge developmental objectives in various sectors, 
particularly the health sector. Common problems such as petty corruption, staff 
absenteeism and under productivity, unacceptably long waiting times and frequent essential 
drug stock-outs at public health facility level are the most commonly documented forms at 
primary care level. Other forms of corruption also exist but are less frequently researched 
and/or cited – probably due to measurement difficulties – such as those linked to theft or 
misuse of public property and resources, unnecessary referrals of patients, and 
regulation/procedure and procurement.  
The many forms of informal practices that occur throughout a health system are often inter- 
dependent. Some types are easy to identify, while others are implicit and more complex. 
Preliminary discussions with health stakeholders in Tanzania suggest that informal payments 
and health-provider absenteeism are of most concern and are prevalent forms of rule-
breaking and rule-bending practices by public health providers. Whatever the corrupt 
behaviour, they all have one thing in common – they negatively impact health systems and 
health outcomes (Petkov and Cohen, 2016). 
Acts of petty corruption – for example informal payments and bribery – are highly reported 
because they happen during the interaction between health providers and clients, and often 
reflect weakly enforced or inadequately financed user fee-exemption and waiver policies 
that were introduced alongside cost-sharing policies to protect the most vulnerable groups 
(i.e. pregnant women, children under five years, elders above 60 years, and patients 
suffering from tuberculosis and HIV/AIDS) and the poorest to facilitate access to essential 
outpatient health services ( Manzi et al., 2005; Maluka, 2013; Mayumana et al., 2013; Mtei 
et al., 2014). As a result, many of the most vulnerable and the poorest are paying out of 
pocket (Binyaruka et al., 2015; Kruk et al., 2008; Mamdani and Bangser, 2004; Manzi et al., 
2005), with important implications for inequity in access to and use of health services 
(Smithson, 2006). Additionally, if supply-side preparation and complementary measures are 
not in place, exemption policies may lead to disruptive effects (Ridde et al., 2012), which 
create loopholes for health providers to either seek or receive informal/unofficial payments. 
Thus, informal payments not only deter poor patients from seeking and accessing care, but 
they also undermine implementation and the intended objectives of exemption and waiver 
policies.  
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The frequency of informal payments offers an important indicator of underlying governance 
failures because it means fraudulent behaviour is being tolerated, that controls are weak 
and ineffective, that patients are unsure of their rights, and accountability is not enforced. 
When the probability of being detected and penalised is very low, informal payments tend 
to be more widespread. Evidence from two pilot programmes in Kyrgyz Republic and 
Cambodia suggests that informal payments can be limited through the setting up of 
alternative sources of funding, however. In these two contexts patient payments and 
utilisation improved: patient spending reduced by 20% for drugs and 50% for supplies 
(Haroon, 2014). 
Absenteeism among health providers and their managers – be it legitimate and officially 
authorised (for example, when attending meetings, seminars, trainings, or on leave (Manzi 
et al., 2012), or unauthorised decisions not to report to work – undermines service 
provision, especially within the context of health-worker shortages. Distinguishing between 
the two forms of absenteeism can be quite difficult, but voluntary absenteeism is often 
characterised by high frequency of absences with long durations (Davey et al., 2009; Belita 
et al., 2013). From a systems perspective, factors influencing absenteeism revolve around 
three themes – workplace/context, personal, and organisational/cultural factors (ibid.), as 
evidenced in South African hospitals (Mudaly and Nkosi, 2015). The specific forms of and 
underlying reasons for absenteeism remain context-specific. In Uganda, for example, 
absenteeism has resulted from family conflicts, overstay in one workstation, drug abuse, 
poor emuneration, inadequate supervision and poor performance management practices 
(Wananda et al., 2015; Nyamweya et al., 2017). The location of ones workplace has also 
been shown to have influenced absenteeism in Kenya, such that absenteeism was higher in 
urban than in rural facilities (Muthama et al., 2008).  
Poor health-provider productivity is also a common phenomenon in many low-income 
countries, including in Tanzania, and results in inefficiencies in the health system. The 
decision to underdeliver is based on multifaceted factors ranging from rent-seeking 
behaviour to lack of motivation, overburdened providers and the absence of an enabling 
environment (Lindkvist, 2013). 
Improving the job satisfaction of health providers by fostering enabling work environments 
and charging official fees with better performance-based (financial and non-financial) 
incentive packages have also been reported as a possible strategy to make health workers 
less vulnerable to corruption and bribery (Haroon, 2014; Lewis, 2004). Other studies suggest 
that such an approach would improve health-worker motivation and their overall 
productivity at the same time (Mæstad, 2006; Leonard and Masatu, 2010; Meessen et al., 
2011; Gertler and Vermeersch, 2013).  
The effectiveness of performance-based financing at local government and facility level in 
curbing informal provider practices will in part depend on the underlying reasons for 
engaging in such practices. For example, are informal payments a voluntary contribution by 
patients to cover the cost of a service or as a ‘thank you’ for services delivered under difficult 
conditions; or are they seen as an abuse of power by the provider? Do such payments 
constitute a significant share of health providers’ income? Will performance-based 
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payments make up for any short-falls and sustain motivation amongst service providers over 
the longer term? Does PBF need to be complemented by a standard comprehensive benefit 
package, such as career development opportunities, a good work environment, safe housing 
and transport, or other incentives?  
Strengthening institutional arrangements through improved good governance and 
accountability, coupled with transparent policy- and decision-making processes that involve 
all stakeholders and interest groups (e.g. politicians, policy-makers, health care providers, 
non-state actors and especially citizens) is one of the most cited measures against corruption 
(Lewis, 2006; Cho and Kirwin, 2007; Vian, 2008; Hussmann, 2011; Aryankhesal, 2017; 
Haroon, 2014; SIKIKA, 2014; Gaitonde et al., 2016). Financial incentives in an environment of 
impunity will fall short of expectations – they have to be accompanied by a combination of 
accountability mechanisms as well.  
Yet accountability processes within the health sector are dynamic and complex. There are 
political challenges to accountability – not limited to poorly functioning or corrupt ministries 
of health or quality-of-care issues in remote health posts – but rather they include a much 
broader set of global health systems actors and initiatives that are intertwined with 
government-sponsored health services at multiple levels, and that influence health 
outcomes (Joshi and Houtzager, 2012; Bruen et al., 2014; IDS, 2018; Nelson et al., 2018).  
The implementation of community scorecards in the health sector has shown considerable 
potential for promoting citizenship engagement. However, evidence from Mozambique 
suggests that the use of CSCs resulted in transfer of roles and responsibilities for public 
health-system functioning from state to citizens, and runs the risk of ‘overburdening’ 
communities at the point of service delivery (Haroon, 2014). Long-term social accountability 
work done by a group of NGOs suggests multi-stakeholder accountability mechanisms – that 
facilitate the cycle of monitoring, review and remedial action, and advance the principles of 
human rights, transparency, and participation – are a pre-requisite for determining the 
needs of marginalised and vulnerable communities, to attain the goal of universal health 
coverage (IDS, 2018).  
Increasingly, discussions in Tanzania centre around adequate financing of the health sector, 
coupled with a range of system-strengthening initiatives to lower informal practices 
amongst public health providers. These include: curbing misuse of the wage bill and 
addressing health-worker shortages and needs-based allocation across the country; 
improved remuneration of health workers, including a standard comprehensive benefit 
package and fair opportunities for professional growth; timely and adequate performance-
based disbursements to councils and facilities for an enabling work environment 
(appropriate supervision, infrastructure, drugs and supplies, housing, safety and security); 
enforcement of improved prepayment health insurance schemes; and improved supervision 
and community-level accountability through, for example, greater involvement of 
community leaders with attention to patient rights and ensuring transparency (Mæstad, 
2006; Kruk et al., 2008; Mæstad and Mwisongo, 2011; Manzi et al., 2012; Lindkvist, 2013; 
Buguzi, 2016b, 2017; Kabote, 2017).  
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The ongoing challenge of recruiting, retaining and appropriately distributing skilled human 
resources remains a risk to the effectiveness and impact of such investments. Attention is 
currently focused on a critical review of the way health providers are trained, deployed, 
rewarded, monitored and held accountable. According to Manzi et al. (2012), to increase 
access and client confidence in the health service requires better availability of skilled health 
workers, improved service management, and support to reduce absenteeism. The authors 
stress: 
 the importance of improved health services management to reduce health workers in 
rural facilities being pulled in different directions – to attend seminars and trainings, and 
to collect their salaries and sometimes vaccines or other supplies from the district 
capitals. Such distractions further undermine their ability to provide services. 
 the need for adequate support to district health management teams (timely 
disbursement of funds, sufficient staff, prior notification of visits, appropriate training for 
supervision and improved supervision of CHMTs by regional- and national-level staff) to 
facilitate their timely supervision and execution of other duties (which could reduce 
absenteeism and mitigate some of the factors that reduce health workers’ productivity). 
They suggest that consideration should be given to integrated supervision to improve the 
efficiency of supervisory visits as observed in the Tanzania Essential Health Intervention 
Programme (TEHIP). 
 the need for more training in health facilities and fewer seminars in district head 
quarters in order to increase health workers’ time for patient care and to increase the 
relevance of trainings.   
To conclude, corruption is a critical issue and a concern across all sectors, including health. 
Tanzania is a diverse country, therefore it is difficult to generalise on the nature and 
underlying determinants of corruption, and how to effectively contain the practice amongst 
frontline health providers. Understanding the forms, causes and consequences of informal 
practices is a first step towards informing context-specific anti-corruption policies or 
interventions, however. Reducing opportunities and incentives to engage in informal 
practices is also important, but these need to be matched with improvements in detection 
of abuse and by enforcement of appropriate anti-corruption sanctions, laws and regulation 
(which requires a functioning judicial system). Efforts to tackle informal practices should aim 
to strengthen good governance in aspects of accountability, transparency and supervision, 
and a well-resourced health system is a pre-requisite. Suggested recommendations for 
controlling petty corruption include both supply- and demand-side measures.  
Yet there remain several unanswered questions: How can we improve the functioning of 
internal accountability mechanisms and the functioning of oversight structures higher up the 
system (e.g. for priority-setting and human resource allocation), as well as external 
accountability mechanisms for the public (e.g. HFGCs and community monitoring systems)? 
How do these mechanisms overlap, complement or compete with each other? What are the 
effects of structural interventions (DHFF, PBF) on issues of high absenteeism, low 
productivity and leakages, and on patient-centred services? Can CSCs be used to monitor the 
presence of health workers – to identify and address management and performance issues 
such as absenteeism, access to services and informal payments? What are feasible options 
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for attracting and retaining skilled health providers to work in rural areas, and for their 
improved performance and management?  
There is no one-size-fits-all initiative that will address all of the constraints and challenges 
facing the system and mitigate informal practices amongst public health providers. The 
central question becomes then, what will work best within the Tanzanian context – what mix 
of strategies and initiatives will result in improved service use and quality, health outcomes 
and equity, to have more meaningful accountability on health-user rights and entitlements? 
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Appendix 
Table A1. Key economic, health status and health systems indicators for mainland 
Tanzania 
Economic indicators  
Population (million), 2016  55.56  
Annual GDP growth (%), 2016 7% (stable for a decade)  
GDP/capita US$, 2016 879.2 
% below national poverty line, 2016 28.2 
Health status indicators 
Average life expectancy at birth (yrs) 2015/16 64.9 
Under-five mortality per 1,000 births, 2016 67 
Infant mortality per 1,000 live births, 2016 40 
Neonatal mortality per 1,000 live births, 2016 22 




Total health expenditure as % GDP, 2015/16 4.7 
Government health expenditure per capita, current, US$, 2015/16 21 
Total health expenditure (THE) per capita, US$ 2015/16 45 
Health Insurance contribution as % THE, 2013-15 5-8 
Out-of-pocket payments as % THE, 2015 22 
External resources for health as % THE, 2015 41 
Source: Todd et al. (2017); World Bank (2017); National Health Accounts 2015/1647 
Table A2. Facility distribution (2016/17) 
 Government (Public) FBOs/NGOs Private for profit Total 
Dispensarie 4,900 654 779 6,333 
Health centres 525 162 115 802 
Hospitals
48
 124 98 43 265 
Total 5,549 914 937 7,400 
% 75.0 12.4 12.7 100 
Note: Government owns 75% of all health facilities; FBOs = Faith Based Organisations. 




 Financing data from NHA 2015/16 data; total health sector financing includes on-budget and off-budget support 
47
 NHA data presented during session on ‘Resource tracking in the health sector’, 19
th
 Joint Annual Health Sector 
Technical Review Meeting, 14-15 November 2018, Dodoma. 
48
 Hospitals includes all hospitals in the country district, regional, national, zonal, special and other hospitals 
Strengthening accountability for better health outcomes through understanding health-system bottlenecks:  
insights from Tanzania 
52 
Table A3. Differences between the standard CHF and iCHF (Dodoma region) 
Standard (old) CHF Redesigned CHF 
No separation between purchaser and provider of health 
services, that is, the Council Health Service Board represents 
both the interests of CH F members and health care 
providers (health facilities) 
Reorganised structure that displays the different roles of 
purchaser (CHF) and health care provider (health facilities) 
Weak data management system Reform of data management system by installation and use 
of an insurance management system with a central server 
with online and offline modes 
Passive enrolment strategy based on health facilities Active dose-to-client strategy with village-level enrolment 
officers 
Restricted benefit package with card applicable at the  
enrolled facility and rarely involving hospital services 
Expanded range of services to include hospitalisation and  
portability of CH F cards within the region 
Passive to no community sensitisation campaigns Active mobilisation campaigns with social marketing 
strategies that involve both community-based campaigns 
and mass media campaigns 
Identity card given to head of the household (only one card 
for the household) 
Each member of the household is given individual 
membership cards 
Source: Kalolo et al. (2018). 
Figure A1. Percentage of Tanzania’s National Budget Allocation to Health 2007–2017 
 
Note: for FY 2017/18, the Government of Tanzania allocated 7% of the national budget (inclusive of CFS) or 10% (exclusive of CFS) to the 
health sector; this estimate includes all on-budget funding from development partners.  
Source: Lee and Tarimo (2018). 
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